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INTRODUCTION

This Recent Developments Article consists of brief synopses of
selected noteworthy cases decided recently by the Montana Supreme Court. Each Development is self-contained. With this Article, the Montana Law Review revives a tradition of bringing to
practitioners' attention several cases of practical significance. The
Montana Law Review does not represent that it surveyed all areas
of Montana law.
II.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

Bache v. Gilden: Motion for Continuance Unnecessary to
Preserve Appeal of Surprise or PrejudicialEvidence
The Montana Supreme Court's decision in Bache v. Gilden'
affirms the court's continued disapproval of "Perry Mason" style
surprise tactics during litigation. In Bache the Montana Supreme
Court, in overruling a line of precedent, 2 held that failure to request a continuance at trial when presented with surprise or prejudicial evidence is no longer a waiver of the right to claim error on
appeal.3 The court's decision adds additional incentive for attorneys to comply with pretrial procedures, since the court will not
allow violations to prejudice the opposing party.
Bache arises from a personal injury action in which the plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued to recover
1. 252 Mont. 178, 827 P.2d 817 (1992).
2. See Barrett v. Asarco, Inc., 234 Mont. 229, 234-36, 763 P.2d 27, 30-31 (1988) (relying on Sikorski v. Olin to hold that plaintiff's failure to request a continuance prevented
plaintiff from claiming prejudice when the district court excluded defendant's offered evidence after a late disclosure of witnesses who would testify as to plaintiff's alleged employee
misconduct); Sikorski v. Olin, 174 Mont. 107, 111, 568 P.2d 571, 573 (1977) (stating that
defendants' failure to request a continuance on the ground of surprise or undue advantage
when the court allowed plaintiff to amend an answer to his interrogatories on the day of
trial constituted a waiver by defendants of any right to claim error on appeal).
3. Bache, 252 Mont. at 182, 827 P.2d at 819.
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damages." During trial, the defendant introduced a survey of the
accident scene into evidence through witness Goacher. The plaintiff objected, claiming surprise and prejudice. In support of his objection, the plaintiff stated that the defendant failed to list
Goacher in the pretrial order and failed to identify Goacher until
shortly before trial.6 Claiming the survey was not "a reasonable resemblance of the condition of the road at the time of the accident," the plaintiff had a vested interest in keeping the exhibit out
of evidence. 6
When the district court overruled the plaintiff's objection, the
plaintiff did not request a continuance. On appeal, the supreme
court stated that the district court abused its discretion and committed reversible error when it allowed Goacher's testimony. The
court held that the plaintiff did not need to request a continuance
to preserve this objection for appeal, since the defendant's "tactics
[were] contrary to the letter and spirit of all pretrial discovery." 7
The defendant failed to identify Goacher or the survey in his
responses to the plaintiff's discovery requests that the defendant
name any witnesses he intended to call at trial and identify any
exhibits he intended to introduce. The defendant indicated that he
would supplement his discovery responses prior to trial.' Additionally, in accordance with the district court's scheduling order, the
parties were to exchange lists of witnesses and exhibits and complete discovery by certain scheduled dates. Despite the court-ordered deadline, the defendant did not provide the plaintiff with a
list of his witnesses until a week after the scheduling order deadline had passed. The defendant sent his list of witnesses by fax but
did not identify Goacher or provide a copy of the survey of the
accident scene. At that time, the defendant listed another witness
who was to provide foundation for the survey. The plaintiff finally
received a copy of the survey one week before trial." Moreover, the
defendant failed to mention Goacher at the final pretrial conference or list him in the pretrial order. The pretrial order stated that
the plaintiff was to depose the witness the defendant identified to
provide the necessary foundation for the survey. The plaintiff then
learned one week before trial that Goacher, rather than the listed
witness, had prepared the survey. The plaintiff was unable to de4. Id. at 179-80, 827 P.2d at 818.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 181, 827 P.2d 819.
7. Id. at 182, 827 P.2d at 819 (quoting Krueger v. General Motors Corp., 240 Mont.
266, 273, 783 P.2d 1340, 1344-45 (1989).
8. Id. at 180-81, 827 P.2d at 818.
9. Id. at 181, 827 P.2d at 818-19.
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pose Goacher prior to trial.1 0
The defendant contended these omissions did not preclude
him from calling Goacher to introduce the survey at trial, since he
had "reserved the right to call additional witnesses as necessary for
foundation" when he initially provided the plaintiff with his list of
witnesses in response to the scheduling order. In rejecting the defendant's argument, the supreme court did not allow this vague,
unilateral reservation to satisfy the requirements of pretrial
disclosure."'
The court reiterated its holding in Workman v. McIntyre
Construction Co. where it found that the tactics employed by the
defendant were "contrary to the letter and spirit of all pretrial discovery which is to prevent surprise, to simplify the issues, and to
permit counsel to prepare their case for trial on the basis of the
pretrial order."1 " This policy works to the advantage of all parties
in preparing their cases for trial.
The 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which formed the pattern for the Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure, were designed to "enhance the planning and management of litigation" in an effort to assist the parties in preparing for
trial and to eliminate surprise during trial." The amendments liberalized discovery and the pretrial process in order to formulate
the issues, eliminate remaining frivolous claims and defenses, and
avoid uncontroverted issues and surprise that could delay the
trial. 4 Inherent in this argument is a sense that during all stages of
litigation, the litigants should be searching for justice rather than
playing games with evidence.
Despite the holding in Bache, parties should still consider requesting a continuance when faced with surprise evidence. While
the request for a continuance is no longer necessary after Bache to
preserve for appeal a claim of surprise, the Montana Supreme
Court may not find the party was prejudiced by the surprise evidence.1 5 Rather, the court may find that the opposing party made
10. Id. at 181, 827 P.2d at 819.
11. Id. at 181-82, 827 P.2d at 819.
12. 190 Mont. 5, 12, 617 P.2d 1281, 1285 (1985) (emphasis added) (holding that admission of a film segment was an abuse of the lower court's discretion since the movie was not
listed as an exhibit in the pretrial order and the movie was not available for pretrial examination to determine its relevancy or comparability to the facts and circumstances involved
in the case).
13.

3 JAMES W. MOORE & RICHARD D. FREER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 16.10-.11

(2d ed. 1993).
14. See id. V 16.11.
15. The defendant in Bache offered no justification or excuse for his lack of disclosure.
Moreover, the court has suggested that efforts to make disclosure as quickly as possible
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sufficient efforts to reveal the surprise evidence to counsel before
trial or had no way of discovering the evidence until its introduction at trial. Consequently, the continuance, if granted by the district court, may remain a party's best opportunity to prepare for
surprise evidence.
III.

COMMERCIAL LAW

Martin v. Dorn Equipment Co.: Montana Applies "Breach of
the Peace" in U.C.C. Repossession Actions
In Martin v. Dorn Equipment Co. 16 the Montana Supreme
Court recognized that the creditors' right to self-help repossession
under the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) was abrogated by
the creditors' breach of the peace in effecting that repossession. In
Martin the court found that the creditors' act of cutting a locked
chain on a gate while effecting self-help repossession of equipment
on the debtors' ranch constituted a breach of the peace."7 Although
the court's holding is consistent with that of other jurisdictions,1 8
many issues with respect to breach of the peace are left for future
resolution.
In Martin the creditors financed the sale of various farm
equipment to the debtors. When the debtors failed to make payments required by the terms of the security agreements, the creditors went to the debtors' ranch to repossess equipment but found
"the gate to the ranch. . . secured by a chain and padlock." Nonetheless, the creditors cut the chain, proceeded onto the debtors'
property, and were confronted by the hired hand-whom the creditors informed of their intent to repossess the equipment. 9
after the party learns of new evidence and efforts to make the witness or exhibit available
may preclude the court from automatically finding reversible error. See Workman, 190
Mont. at 12, 617 P.2d at 1285 (citing defendant's failure to offer any justification or excuse
for failing to disclose exhibit until just prior to showing it to the jury). Cf. Barrett, 234
Mont. at 234-35, 763 P.2d at 30 (noting that defendant "gave notice of the new witnesses
and the content of their testimony nearly a month before trial. . . . [and] also offered to
promptly have the new witnesses deposed at its expense"). But see Glacier Nat'l Bank v.
Challinor, 253 Mont. 412, 417, 833 P.2d 1046, 1049 (1992) (reiterating that the court's prior
holding in Sikorski has been overruled by Bache and negating any future reliance thereon
for the proposition that failure to request a continuance at trial waives the objecting party's
right to rely on the objection of surprise on appeal).
16. 250 Mont. 422, 821 P.2d 1025 (1991).
17. Id. at 42, 821 P.2d at 1028.
18. See Laurel Coal Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 539 F. Supp. 1006, 1007-08 (W.D.
Pa. 1982). But see Global Casting Indus., Inc. v. Daley-Hodkin Corp., 432 N.Y.S.2d 453, 456
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980) (defendant's employee "entered the plaintiffs premises by use of a key
unauthorizedly obtained. Such an entry, even if the chains were cut . . . does not, as a
matter of law, constitute a breach of the peace.").
19. Martin, 250 Mont. at 424-25, 821 P.2d at 1026-27.
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
creditors concluding as a matter of law that the creditors did not
breach the peace in effecting repossession of the debtors' equipment.2" On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court noted that both
the security agreements and section 30-9-503 of the Montana Code
authorized the creditors to repossess the debtors' equipment without resort to judicial process. 2 1 Section 30-9-503, however, limits
the creditors' authority to instances in which self-help repossession
can be effected without breaching the peace.2 2 Beyond cutting the
chain and confronting the hired hand, the court made no suggestion that the repossession resulted in violence or presented a potentially violent situation.2
To determine whether the creditors' conduct constituted a
breach of the peace under section 30-9-503, the court cited the
general rule that "the creditor cannot utilize force or threats, cannot enter the debtor's residence without consent, and cannot seize
any property over the debtor's objections. "24 The court then
turned to a factually analogous case, Laurel Coal Co. v. Walter E.
Heller & Co.2 5 The court in Laurel Coal found "that any form of
forcible entry constitutes breach of the peace. ' 26 Relying on Laurel
Coal, the court in Martin similarly concluded that by cutting the
locked chain without the debtors' consent, the creditors forcibly
entered the debtors' property, thereby breaching the peace.27 As a
result, the supreme court reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment in the creditors' favor, holding instead that the
creditors breached the peace,28 making their repossession unlawful.
Generally, self-help repossession existed at common law before
adoption of the U.C.C. 29 Section 9-503 of the U.C.C. authorizes
self-help repossession if it can be done without breach of the
20. Id. at 426, 821 P.2d at 1027.
21. Id.
22. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9-503 (1991). See Salisbury Livestock Co. v. Colorado
Credit Union, 793 P.2d 470, 473 (Wyo. 1990) (describing self-help repossession as a "conditional self-help privilege" (emphasis added)).
23. Martin, 250 Mont. at 425, 821 P.2d at 1026-27.
24. Id. at 427, 821 P.2d at 1028 (quoting JONATHAN SHELDON & ROBERT A. SABLE, REPOSSESSIONS § 6.3 (1988)).
25. 539 F. Supp. 1006 (finding breach of the peace where creditor cut a chain to access
debtor's commercial property for the purpose of repossessing a bulldozer).
26. Id. at 1007-08 (identifying the policy bases for the court's ruling as "the protection
of real property interests and the law's aversion to trespass").
27. Martin, 250 Mont. at 427, 821 P.2d at 1028.
28. Id. at 428, 821 P.2d at 1028.
29. See generally Connecticut v. Indrisano, 613 A.2d 1375, 1378 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992)
(citing James R. McCall, The Past as Prologue:A History of the Right to Repossess, 47 S.
CAL. L. REV. 58, 72-75 (1973)).
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peace; otherwise creditors must resort to judicial remedies.3 0 By
providing self-help repossession, the U.C.C. balances the creditors'
interests in efficient repossession and "reduced costs of credit for
debtors" on one side against society's "need to avoid possibly violent confrontations between debtors and creditors" and "private
property interests" on the other.3 1 Consequently, if abused, selfhelp repossession "invades the legitimate conflict resolution func32
tion of the courts.
Since breach of the peace is not defined in either the U.C.C. or
the Montana Code, a definition is left to Montana courts. As the
law review cited by the court in Laurel Coal notes, definitions of
breach of the peace are based on a variety of interests: society's
interest in prohibiting the use, threat of use, or potential use of
force or violence (often prohibited by criminal law sanctions); real
property interests; personal property interests; and the debtors'
objections to repossession. 3 White and Summers suggest that the
majority of courts focus on: (1) the premises upon which creditors
effect entry and (2) debtors' consent to the repossession." The
Montana Supreme Court did not, however, expressly adopt this
approach in Martin.
30.

Montana adopted section 9-503 of the U.C.C. in its entirety in 1963:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without
judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by
action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may require the
debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a
place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to
both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment unusable,
and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises under 30-9-504.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9-503 (1991).
31. See Riley State Bank v. Spillman, 750 P.2d 1024, 1029 (Kan. 1988); General Elec.
Credit Corp. v. Timbrook, 291 S.E.2d 383, 385 (W. Va. 1982); Salisbury Livestock, 793 P.2d
at 473.
32. See Salisbury Livestock, 793 P.2d at 473 (quoting Sam 0. Simmerman & John
Variola, Case Comment, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Byrd: Is Repossession Accomplished by
the Use of Stealth, Trickery, or Fraud a Breach of the Peace Under Uniform Commercial
Code Section 9-503?, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 504 (1979)); Kimble v. Universal TV Rental, Inc.,
417 N.E.2d 597, 601 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1980) (finding creditor liable for trespass, conversion,
compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney fees after repossessing television from
debtor's locked apartment).
33. Eugene Mikolajczyk, Comment, Breach of Peace and Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code-A Modern Definition for an Ancient Restriction, 82 DICK. L. REv.
351, 354-72 (1978).
-34. 2 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 27-6 (3d
ed. 1988) ("In most cases, to determine if a breach of the peace has occurred, courts inquire
mainly into: (1) whether there was entry by the creditor upon the debtor's premises; and (2)
whether the debtor or one acting on his behalf consented to the entry and repossession.").
See, e.g., Wade v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 668 P.2d 183, 186 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); Bloomquist v. First Nat'l Bank, 378 N.W.2d 81, 84 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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Many breach of the peace issues are left for future resolution.
For example, other courts categorize the type of premises upon
which the creditor effects entry as residential, commercial, or that
of a third-party. 35 Privacy expectations, time and manner of entry,
property status, and rural versus urban setting also are taken into
account.36 Courts have generally found that common law trespass
alone does not constitute breach of the peace. 7 In fact, one court
has noted that the U.C.C. implies "a limited privilege to enter."38
Furthermore, whether the debtor protests the repossession
causes difficulty. Some courts have held that if the debtor protests,
the creditor must seek judicial relief to avoid overriding any valid
defenses the debtor might have.3 9 White and Summers discuss
"the [unclear] effect of a clause in the security agreement purporting to authorize non-judicial repossession"4 and state that avoiding breach of the peace "answers not only to the needs of the
debtor, but also to those of his wife and children, and to the public
policy against fistfights and shoot-outs. Such a rule should not be
varied merely because of a prior agreement between a creditor and
a debtor." 4 ' White and Summers further argue:
It is consistent with the underlying policy to find on the one
hand, that a consent given contemporaneously with the repossession is effective and, on the other hand, that one given weeks or
months before in a clause in the security agreement is ineffective.
In the former case, the debtor fully appreciates the consequences
of his consent and has no time in which to change his mind. That
is not so in the latter case. For these reasons, the contemporaneous consent affords substantial protection against violence, while
an earlier written consent does not. Since the goal of the breach
of the peace doctrine is to prevent violence, not 42to protect contract expectations, the distinction is appropriate.
In Martin the Montana Supreme Court recognized that the
creditors breached the peace while effecting self-help repossession.
The creditors' forcible entry onto the debtors' property constituted
the breach of the peace. As self-help repossession continues, other
35.

See Mikolajczyk, supra note 33, at 358-62.

36.
37.

See, e.g., Salisbury Livestock, 793 P.2d at 474-75.
See Nebraska v. Trackwell, 458 N.W.2d 181, 184 (Neb. 1990).

38. Marine Midland Bank-Central v. Cote, 351 So. 2d 750, 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977).
39. See Hopkins v. First Union Bank, 387 S.E.2d 144, 146 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (noting
defaulting debtor's "unequivocal oral protest"); First & Farmers Bank of Somerset, Inc. v.
Henderson, 763 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Bloomquist, 378 N.W.2d at 84.
40. 2 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 34, at 579.
41.
42.

2 id. at 580.
2 id. at 580 n.33.
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factual situations will present additional issues for resolution by
Montana courts.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Great Falls Public Schools and
Associated Press v. Board of Public Education: Statutory
Collective Bargaining and Litigation Exceptions to Right-toKnow Provision Clause Found Unconstitutional
In 1972 the people of Montana ratified the Montana Constitution-a constitution unique among all other states in that it contains a right-to-know clause" recognizing the public's interest in
open government. The right-to-know clause prohibits state agencies from closing meetings to members of the public, including
members of the press, unless individual privacy exceeds the merits
of public disclosure." Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Great Falls Public Schools and Associated Press v. Board of Public Education,
two cases of first impression, demonstrate the strength of the Montana Supreme Court's commitment to prohibiting statutory limitations on the public's constitutional right to know. 5 Admittedly, by
broadening the public's constitutional right to access state government, public agencies' ability to function in an economically efficient manner may be impacted."'
In 1977 the Montana Legislature amended the then-existing
Montana open meeting statute 4 7 to add collective bargaining and
litigation exceptions to the constitutional right-to-know provision.4" The statutory exceptions allowed a public agency to close a
43. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9 (titled "Right to know"): "No person shall be deprived of
the right to examine documents or to observe the deliberations of all public bodies or agencies of state government and its subdivisions, except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure."
44. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 9. See State ex rel. Great Falls Tribune Co. v. District
Court, 238 Mont. 310, 317, 777 P.2d 345, 349 (1989) ("[tlhe press also enjoys this right...
because of its surrogate role for the public").
45. Great Falls Tribune Co. v. Great Falls.Pub. Schools, 255 Mont. 125, 131, 841 P.2d
502, 505 (1992) (holding that public school board may close its collective bargaining strategy
meetings only when the need for individual privacy exceeds the merits of public disclosure);
Associated Press v. Board of Pub. Educ., 246 Mont. 386, 392, 804 P.2d 376, 379 (1991)
(holding that absent a demand of individual privacy exceeding the merits of disclosure,
Montana citizens have a constitutional right to attend meetings of a public agency held to
discuss potential litigation strategy against another state governmental entity).
46. Bob Anez, Court Wants Labor Talks Out in Open, MISSOULIAN, Nov. 13, 1992, at
B2; Unions Don't See It as Much of a Victory, MISSOULIAN, Nov. 13, 1992, at B2.
47. 1977 Mont. Laws 567.
48. MONT. REV. CODE § 82-3402 (1947) (current version at MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203
(1991)) (titled "Meetings of public agencies and certain associations of public agencies to be
open to public-exceptions"):
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meeting to discuss strategy regarding collective bargaining or litigation. 9 In 1978 Montana Attorney General Mike Greely anticipated the issue presented by Associated Press and Great Falls
Tribune when he stated: "The open-meeting statute purports to go
beyond the interests of individual privacy" as provided in Article
II, section 9.50 Recognizing that he, as attorney general, had no authority to question the constitutionality of section 2-3-203(4) of the
Montana Code, Attorney General Greely noted: "[T]he mere presence of discussions relating to collective bargaining or litigation
strategy without more is insufficient to allow a meeting to be
closed under Article II, section 9." '51
Despite Attorney General Greely's opinion, subsequent Montana Legislatures did not resolve the conflict between Article II,
section 9 and section 2-3-203(4). In fact, two subsequent legislatures amended the open meeting statute without addressing this
conflict.2 The public, likewise, has not amended the right-to-know
clause, despite its ability to do so.5" Consequently, until the court's
decisions in Associated Press and Great Falls Tribune, the conflict
remained between the constitutional and statutory right-to-know
provisions.
In 1989 the Board of Public Education (Board) conducted a
telephone conference call meeting of its members and its attorney
to discuss potential litigation strategy challenging Executive Order
04-89. 5" The Board voted to close the meeting to discuss its strat(1) All meetings of public or governmental bodies, boards, bureaus, commissions, agencies of the state, or any political subdivision of the state or organizations or agencies supported in whole or in part by public funds or expending public funds must be open to the public.
(4) However, a meeting may be closed to discuss a strategy to be followed
with respect to collective bargaining or litigation when an open meeting would
have a detrimental effect on the bargaining or litigating position of the public
agency.
49. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-203(4) (1991).
50. 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 716, 719 (1978).
51. Id.
52. See 1987 Mont. Laws 183; 1979 Mont. Laws 380.
53. See MONT. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 8 and 9 (providing for amendment by legislative
referenda and constitutional initiatives). Although arguably seldom exercised, the public has
the right either to provide for additional constitutional exceptions to the right-to-know provision or to delegate legislative authority to enact additional statutory exceptions. If the
citizens were to amend Montana's constitutional right-to-know provision either by providing
additional constitutional exceptions or by delegating authority to the legislature to enact
statutory exceptions, the provision would then be similar to that of other states. See Brief of
Plaintiffs and Respondents at Appendix B, Associated Press (No. 89-589) (citing provisions
of the Louisiana, New Hampshire, and North Dakota constitutional right-to-know
provisions).
54. Associated Press, 246 Mont. at 388-89, 804 P.2d at 377-78. The Governor's Execu-
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egy and, despite an Associated Press reporter's objection, excluded
the reporter and two other non-Board members from the meeting.
When the meeting reopened, the Board allowed the excluded individuals to re-enter and then unanimously passed a motion calling
for a court challenge to the Governor's executive order. Thereafter,
Associated Press, its member news organizations, the Montana
Newspaper Association, and the Montana Chapter of the Society
of Professional Journalists filed suit against the Board challenging
the constitutionality of section 2-3-203(4)." 5
In 1990 Great Falls Public Schools, Board of Trustees (Trustees) conducted negotiations with a bargaining unit of teachers'
aides and library aides. Following receipt of a written report of a
fact-finder engaged by the Trustees to conduct a hearing and make
recommendations regarding the negotiations, the Trustees announced that a closed meeting would be held to discuss the factfinder's report. The Great Falls Tribune requested the meeting be
open, and the Trustees complied. The meeting, however, contained
no deliberation of the fact-finder's report. Rather, the Trustees
voted to reject the report without discussion. The Great Falls Tribune filed suit against the Trustees alleging that the Trustees discussed the matter privately prior to the open meeting at which the
56
vote was taken.
As a result of Associated Press and Great Falls Tribune, the
Montana Supreme Court found unconstitutional both the litigation exception and the collective bargaining exception found in
section 2-3-203(4). 57 In Associated Press the court addressed a narrow issue: "[W]hether the citizens of the [s]tate of Montana have
an absolute constitutional right to attend and observe a meeting
held by a public body or state agency which is held to discuss litigation strategy to be used in potential litigation against another
state governmental entity. '58 The court held that absent a demand
of individual privacy that exceeds the merits of disclosure, Montana citizens have a constitutional right to attend meetings of public agencies held to discuss potential litigation strategy against another state governmental entity.5 9 The court's decision will impact
tive Order 04-89 "required that the Board's administrative rules be submitted to the Governor for review and approval." Id. at 388, 804 P.2d at 377.
55. Id. at 389, 804 P.2d at 377-78.
56. Great Falls Tribune, 255 Mont. at 127, 841 P.2d at 503.
57. Id. at 131, 841 P.2d at 505 (holding collective bargaining exception unconstitutional); Associated Press, 246 Mont. at 392, 804 P.2d at 379 (holding litigation exception
unconstitutional).
58. Associated Press, 246 Mont. at 389, 804 P.2d at 378.
59. Id. at 392, 804 P.2d at 379.
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significantly the relationship between state agencies and their
attorneys.
The issue the court addressed in Great Falls Tribune, however, may have an equally far-reaching effect: "[W]hether Article
II, [s]ection 9, require[d] a balancing of the right to know with
other constitutional provisions and policy considerations or
whether individual privacy is the only matter against which the
right to know should be balanced."6 0 The court held that absent a
demand of individual privacy exceeding the merits of disclosure,
Montana citizens have a constitutional right to attend collective
bargaining strategy discussions of public agencies. 1
Several well-established Montana rules of constitutional interpretation are significant to the court's discussion of the right-toknow clause and section 2-3-203. When the constitution addresses
a specific subject, the constitutional declarations prevent the legislature from enacting statutes extinguishing or limiting the powers
conferred by the constitution.2 Consequently, the court could not
ignore the right-to-know clause in applying section 2-3-203(4) to
the facts presented by Associated Press and Great Falls Tribune.
Additionally, Montana case law establishes that rules of statutory interpretation also apply to constitutional interpretation.
Thus, Montana statutory law and case law provide that courts may
not expand the statutes or constitutional provisions by inserting
what has been omitted or omitting what has been inserted.64
6 5
Courts must first look to the plain meaning of the language used.
No other means of construction are permitted if the language of
66
the statute is clear.
The Montana Supreme Court has previously determined that
the language of Article II, section 9 is unambiguous and provides
only one exception to the public's right to know.6 7 However, the
Board argued in Associated Press that the meaning of the terms
60. Great Falls Tribune, 255 Mont. at 129, 841 P.2d at 504.
61. Id. at 131, 841 P.2d at 505.
62. Noll v. City of Bozeman, 166 Mont. 504, 507, 534 P.2d 880, 881 (1975) (citing State
ex rel. Pierce v. Gowdy, 62 Mont. 119, 126, 203 P. 1115, 1116 (1922); State ex rel. DuFresne
v. Leslie, 100 Mont. 449, 454, 50 P.2d 959, 962 (1935); and State ex rel. Bonner v. Dixon, 59
Mont. 58, 76, 195 P. 841, 844 (1921)).
63. Great Falls Tribune, 255 Mont. at 128-29, 841 P.2d at 504 (citing Keller v. Smith,
170 Mont. 399, 404, 553 P.2d 1002, 1006 (1976)).
64. MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-2-101 (1991); In re Adoption of Smigaj, 171 Mont. 537, 540,
560 P.2d 141, 143 (1977).
65. Smigaj, 171 Mont. at 540, 560 P.2d at 143.
66. Id.
67. Great Falls Tribune v. District Court, 186 Mont. 433, 437-38, 608 P.2d 116, 119
(1980).
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"deliberations," "meeting," and "documents" in Article II, section
9 were potentially ambiguous as applied to the facts of Associated
Press, and thus required the court to resort to other methods of
interpretation to decide the issue presented. 8 The supreme court
did not find the Board's argument persuasive under the factual situation presented by Associated Press. 9 Because the supreme court
found no ambiguity existed, the court found it unnecessary to consider additional common law of Montana or other states, the history of Montana statutory open meeting laws, the intent of the
delegates to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention, or what
other states have recognized as additional public policy exceptions
to the public's right to know. 70 Regarding the constitutionality of
section 2-3-203(4), the court in Associated Press concluded by
stating in dicta that the dispute presented by the factual situation
at hand was the very essence of "the public's business. '7 1 This
statement implies that the court may be receptive to future public
policy arguments for narrowing what currently appears to be liberal protection of the public's interest in open government.
Since ratification of the constitutional right-to-know clause,
the Montana Supreme Court has balanced the public's right to
know against competing individual constitutional interests on a
case-by-case basis. 72 Associated Press and Great Falls Tribune,
68. Brief of Defendant and Appellant at 37-38, Associated Press (No. 89-589). "Meeting" arguably is not ambiguous in light of MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-3-202 (1991) which states:
"'[M]eeting' means the convening of a quorum of the constituent membership of a public
agency or association described in 2-3-203, whether corporal or by means of electronic
equipment, to hear, discuss, or act upon a matter over which the agency has supervision,
control, jurisdiction, or advisory power." See also Board of Trustees v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 186 Mont. 148, 152-56, 606 P.2d 1069, 1071-73 (1980) (discussing statutes that
regulate "meetings"); 42 Op. Atty' Gen. 198, 198-99 (1988) (finding that "discussions between the director of the Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks and representatives of the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes are [not] subject to Montana's open meeting statutory provisions. . . because the director of the Department, when acting alone on behalf of
the Department, does not fall within the scope of the term 'quorum of the constituent membership' [as defined by 2-3-202]").
69. Associated Press, 246 Mont. at 391-92, 804 P.2d at 379.
70. Id., at 391, 804 P.2d at 379. In past cases, after finding ambiguities, the court
looked to and drew from these very sources. See, e.g., Missoulian v. Board of Regents of
Higher Educ., 207 Mont. 513, 522, 675 P.2d 962, 967 (1984) (citing delegate Dorothy Eck's
statement on behalf of the Bill of Rights Committee at the 1978 Montana Constitutional
Convention with regard to the right-to-know provision).
71. Associated Press, 246 Mont. at 392, 804 P.2d at 380.
72. See, e.g., Missoulian, 207 Mont. at 533, 675 P.2d at 973 (holding "that the demands of individual privacy of university presidents and other university personnel in confidential job performance evaluation sessions of the Board of Regents clearly exceed any
merit of public disclosure"); Engrav v. Cragun, 236 Mont. 260, 267-68, 769 P.2d 1224, 1229
(1989) (holding that individual privacy rights in law enforcement telephone logs, criminal
investigation records, and pre-employment records outweigh a university student's desire to
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however, present situations in which the court balanced the public's right to know against competing public agency constitutional
interests. To date, the court has not identified any public agency
constitutional right that outweighs the public's right to know.
In Associated Press the supreme court dismissed the Board's
contention that the Board's constitutional right to due process, on
balance, was superior to that of the public's constitutional right to
know. 7 3 An underpinning of the court's rejection of the Board's
contention was the general rule that neither the State nor its political subdivisions have a constitutional right to due process.74 The
court based its rejection on the United States Supreme Court's decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, which held that the word
''person" in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause cannot be
expanded to include states.7 5 Montana authority also exists for this
proposition. 76 However, should an individual defendant rather
than a governmental entity come before the court, due process arguments may be applicable.
In Great Falls Tribune the Trustees suggested that the constitutional mandate that school district trustees supervise and control
schools should outweigh the public's right to know." The Trustees
suggested further that supervision and control "include a duty to
bargain effectively and to spend monies in an effective and responsible manner. ' 78 The Trustees' argument, however, failed to persuade the court. Rather, the court found that the power to control
schools did not confer a power to ignore other constitutional
79
guarantees.
The court's decision in Great Falls Tribune highlights two approaches to reviewing the Montana constitutional right-to-know
clause. When the court considers an individual's right to privacy
versus the public's right to know, the court applies a balancing
do a study for a school research project); Belth v. Bennett, 227 Mont. 341, 345, 740 P.2d 638,
640-41 (1987) (holding that a corporation can assert the right-to-privacy exception and governmental agencies can assert the privacy interests of another); State ex rel. Great Falls
Tribune, 238 Mont. at 320, 777 P.2d at 351 (holding that "closure for a probation revocation
proceeding [is appropriate to avoid the] danger of harm to a person involved").
73. Associated Press, 246 Mont. at 390-91, 804 P.2d at 378-79.
74. Id. (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)).
75. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323-24.
76. See Fitzpatrick v. State Bd. of Examiners, 105 Mont. 234, 241, 70 P.2d 285, 288
(1937).
77. Great Falls Tribune, 255 Mont. at 129-30, 841 P.2d at 504-05. See MONT. CONST.
art. X, § 8 which states: "The supervision and control of schools in each school district shall
be vested in a board of trustees ...."
78. Great Falls Tribune, 255 Mont. at 130, 841 P.2d at 504.
79. Id. at 130, 841 P.2d at 505.
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test, and the individual's right to privacy generally prevails.80 However, when the court considers a public agency's constitutional
mandate versus the public's right to know, the balancing test is
unnecessary, and the public's right to know appears to prevail
again."8
While the court's decision in Associated Press appears to significantly increase access to public agency meetings, the facts of
the case actually require a much narrower interpretation of the
holding. Under the facts of the case, the court merely held that
when public agencies meet in a quorum and discuss potential litigation between public entities, the public agency must do so in a
meeting open to the public. s2 The issue of whether a state agency
can close its meeting to discuss litigation with a private individual
was not addressed by the court in Associated Press. For example,
the court might find constitutional a statute allowing a public
agency to close a meeting regarding potential litigation strategy between a state agency and an individual. Moreover, the court's holding in Associated Press does not suggest that the legislature is precluded from adopting statutes balancing an individual's privacy
against the merits of public disclosure.
Further, while the supreme court is clear on what exceptions
are allowed to the public's constitutional right to know, the court
may find specific terminology relating to the terms "deliberations,"
"meeting," and "documents" ambiguous. Several statements made
by the district court judge in his opinion and order in Associated
Press may increase the significance of these terms to future litigation.83 Therefore, the court may be called upon to interpret Article
80. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Serv. Regulation, 194
Mont. 277, 287-89, 634 P.2d 181, 188 (1981) (compelling state interest must be shown when
statute affects a fundamental right). The Attorney General suggested the following balancing test: "(1) determin[e] whether a matter of individual privacy is involved, (2) determin[e]
the demands of that privacy and the merits of publicly disclosing the information at issue,
and (3) decid[e] whether the demand of individual privacy clearly outweighs the demand of
public disclosure." 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 716, 719 (1978). To determine if a right of privacy is
involved, the supreme court looks to "whether the person involved ha[s] a subjective or
actual expectation of privacy" and, if so, "whether society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable." Citizens to Recall Mayor Whitlock v. Whitlock, 255 Mont. 517, 522,
844 P.2d 74, 77 (1992).
81. Great Falls Tribune, 255 Mont. at 130-31, 841 P.2d at 505.
82. Associated Press, 246 Mont. at 392, 804 P.2d at 379-80.
83. In his Opinion and Order, District Judge Sherlock suggests several ways lawyers
can deal with their public agency clients without violating the public's constitutional right
to know:
Counsel for the State and its agencies can prepare a case for trial without discussing plans in detail with agency clients during public meetings.
Article II, Section 9 does not state that public lawyers must reveal client
secrets or that they may not communicate with their clients in confidence ....
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II, section 9 further.
The 1993 Montana Legislature amended section 2-3-203 by
deleting the statutory collective bargaining exception from subsection (4).14 The legislature, however, has attempted to retain some
semblance of a litigation exception."6 The newly revised section 23-203(4)(B) is an apparent attempt by the legislature to codify the
supreme court's holding in Associated Press.6 Section 2-3203(4)(A), however, suggests either that litigation between a public
body or association and an individual is not adequately protected
by section 2-3-203(3) or, possibly, that the supreme court would
find a constitutional exception for litigation between a public body
or association and some other entity. The outcome of the constitutionality of the legislature's newly revised section 2-3-203(4) remains to be seen, although little if anything in the court's recent
decisions suggests the exception found in the newly revised section
Article II, Section 9 requires only that when a quorum of a board is present, the
meeting must be open, even when litigation strategy is an agenda item....
... [N]othing prevents the attorney from discussing litigation strategy in private with members of the body singly, or in groups of less than a quorum.
Opinion and Order at 30-31, Associated Press (No. 89-589). See also supra note 68.
84. S.B. No. 250, 53d Mont. Leg., 1993 Mont. Laws 123.
85. Senate Bill 250 read:
(1) All meetings of public or governmental bodies, boards, bureaus, commissions, agencies of the state, or any political subdivision of the state or organizations or agencies supported in whole or in part by public funds or expending public funds must be open to the public.
(2) All meetings of associations that are composed of public or governmental
bodies referred to in subsection (1) and that regulate the rights, duties, or privileges of any individual must be open to the public.
(3) Provided, however, the presiding officer of any meeting may close the
meeting during the time the discussion relates to a matter of individual privacy
and then if and only if the presiding officer determines that the demands of individual privacy clearly exceed the merits of public disclosure. The right of individual privacy may be waived by the individual about whom the discussion pertains
and, in that event, the meeting must be open.
(4) (A) However, except as provided by subsection (4)(B), a meeting may be
closed to discuss a strategy to be followed with respect to litigation when an
open meeting would have a detrimental effect on the litigating position of the
public agency.
(B) A meeting may not be closed to discuss strategy to be followed in litigation in which the only parties are public bodies or associations described in subsections (1) and (2).
(5) Any committee or subcommittee appointed by a public body or an association described in subsection (2) for the purpose of conducting business which is
within the jurisdiction of that agency is subject to the requirements of this
section.
Id. (amendments italicized).
86. Committee minutes for S.B. 250 were unavailable at the time this Article went to
press, so the authors were unable to determine with more accuracy what the legislative intent behind S.B. 250 may have been.
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2-3-203(4) is any more constitutional than the exceptions found in
the old version.
The ramifications of the court's decision in Great Falls Tribune may be even more far-reaching than those of the Associated
Press decision. Given the court's dislike of clandestine meetings
conducted to avoid the public right-to-know provision, 87 school
boards and other affected public bodies and associations appear to
be left with negotiating collective bargaining agreements in open
meetings where the opposition will be fully aware of their bargaining strength. This unequal bargaining strength may undermine
public agencies' ability to fully represent the public's interest. Unfortunately, more than 500 school districts in Montana are left
with little guidance as to how to proceed absent closed strategy
sessions. Efficient and effective functioning of governmental agencies also may be affected by strong lobbyist groups who influence
the agencies in a manner neither anticipated nor desired by the
public. Resolution of these issues is left for future determination.
On balance, however, public agency decisions are the public's
business. If the public feels agency discussions of litigation and collective bargaining strategies in open meetings are detrimental to
the public's interests, the public can amend the constitution to
provide otherwise. Until then, the Montana Supreme Court will
likely continue construing the right-to-know provision in favor of
public access, particularly in the absence of individual privacy concern considerations.
V.

CONTRACT LAW

Weber v. Rivera: Montana's Approach to Liquidated Damages
Highlighted in the Real Estate Context
Mr. and Mrs. Rivera traveled from California to Montana, interested in purchasing real property. After viewing the Weber
ranch property, the Riveras offered to purchase the property for
$430,000, deposited $5,000 in earnest money, and signed a form
purchase contract. The local real estate agency's national sponsor,
United National Real Estate, provided the form and required its
use. The Webers subsequently executed the contract.8 8 Shortly
thereafter, the Riveras refused to perform under the contract because lab results indicated that the water at the Weber residence
87. Flesh v. Board of Trustees, 241 Mont. 158, 163, 786 P.2d 4, 7 (1990) (noting that
"[t]his [clourt disapproves of clandestine meetings of public bodies which violate the spirit
and the letter of the open meeting laws").
88. Weber v. Rivera, 255 Mont. 195, 196-97, 841 P.2d 534, 535 (1992).
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was contaminated. The Webers then sued for breach of contract.8 9
The trial court determined that the Riveras knew about the water
quality prior to executing the contract. Their refusal to perform
was, therefore, a breach of the purchase contract.'0
As is customary in the real estate industry, the purchase
agreement contained a liquidated damages provision. That provision provided that in the event of breach, the breaching party
would pay the non-breaching party ten percent of the purchase
price. The district court thus awarded the Webers the amount
stipulated in the purchase agreement-ten percent of $430,000.9
On appeal, the supreme court reversed, holding the liquidated
damages provision void as a penalty because it was "not the result
of a reasonable ' 2estimate in advance to determine what the damages might be.'

In Weber v. Rivera the Montana Supreme Court continued to
void contract provisions that the court perceives as penal. Penalty
provisions are generally inserted in contracts "to coerce performance rather than to estimate damages."' 3 Section 28-2-721 of the
Montana Code states that provisions fixing damages in advance are
void unless at the time of contracting, "it would be impracticable
or extremely difficult to fix the actual damage.

'9 4

In Morgen & Os-

good Construction Co. v. Big Sky of Montana, Inc. the court ventured beyond the statute to attach the additional requirement that
the amount specified be a reasonable estimate of the actual damages.' Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 and the Restatement of
Contracts endorse liquidated damages in an amount that is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual damages and declare unreasonably high liquidated damages void as a penalty.' 6
Traditionally, courts have applied a three-pronged test to distinguish whether a provision stipulating damages is a valid liquidated damages provision or void as a penalty provision.' 7 In Mor89. Id. at 197-98, 841 P.2d at 535-36.
90. Id. at 199, 841 P.2d at 536.
91. Id. at 199-200, 841 P.2d at 537.
92. Id. at 201, 841 P.2d at 538.
93. Justin Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60 CAL. L. REV. 84, 92 (1972).
Similarly, fear of contracts of adhesion has caused courts and legislatures to increase legal
controls over the freedom of contract. Id. at 85.
94. MONT.CODE ANN. § 28-2-721 (1991).
95. Morgen & Osgood Constr. Co. v. Big Sky of Mont., Inc., 171 Mont. 268, 273-74, 557
P.2d 1017, 1020-21 (1976).
96. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (1990) (appearing in identical form in MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 30-2-718(1) (1991)); U.C.C. § 2A-504(1) (1990) (appearing in identical form in MONT.
CODE ANN. § 30-2A-504(1) (1991)); RESTATEMrNT (SzcoND) OF CONTRAcTs § 356(1) (1979).
97. See Morgen & Osgood, 171 Mont. at 273, 557 P.2d at 1020; JOHN D. CALAMARI &
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gen & Osgood, the court set forth the three prongs in an oftenquoted paragraph:
Whether the forfeiture provision imposed a penalty, or provided for liquidated damages, is to be determined from the language and subject matter of the contract, the evident [1] intent of
the parties and all the facts and circumstances under which the
contract was made. The most important facts to be considered
are [2] whether the damages were difficult to ascertain, and [3]
whether the stipulated amount is a reasonable estimate of probable damages or is reasonably proportionateto the actual damage sustained at the time of the breach.98
With respect to the first prong of the Morgen & Osgood
test-the parties' intent, the fact that the parties labeled a provision as either a penalty or a liquidated damages clause is not determinative of intent.9 Additionally, the second prong on its face appears met in Weber since real estate valuation is at best an
imprecise art. The real estate market's tendency to fluctuate rapidly makes accurate estimation of potential damages difficult, if
not impossible.10 0
According to commentators, the third prong is determinative
in most courts. 10 1 The present case is no exception. However, in
Weber the court's interpretation of the language of the third
prong-reasonable estimate of probable damages-requires more
than a provision setting forth the real estate industry's standard
estimate of probable damages.1 0 2 The Webers argued that the third
prong was met, but the court dismissed "any relationship between
the amount of actual damages suffered and the amount specified in
the provision [as] merely a fortuitous coincidence and not the result of a reasonable estimate in advance to determine what the
damages might be."103 The court's understanding of the third
prong appears to incorporate notions of intent from the first prong,
as manifested in something more than reading the contract before
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-31 (3d ed. 1987).

98. Morgen & Osgood, 171 Mont. at 273, 557 P.2d at 1020 (emphasis added) (quoting
Waggoner v. Johnston, 408 P.2d 761, 769 (Okla. 1965)).
99. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105, 120-21 (1907); Morgen &
Osgood, 171 Mont. at 272-73, 557 P.2d at 1020-21; CAIAMAus & PERILLO, supra note 97, at
641.
100. See Thomas B. Hartley Constr. Co. v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 371 S.E.2d 657, 660
(Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (Beasley, J., dissenting), rev'd, 375 S.E.2d 222, 223 (Ga. 1989).
101. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 97, at 641 & n.46.
102. Weber, 255 Mont. at 200, 841 P.2d at 537-38. But cf. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 371
S.E.2d at 659 ("A 10 percent liquidated damages provision is not unusual in the real estate
industry and is an accepted pre-estimate of damages.").

103. Weber, 255 Mont. at 201, 841 P.2d at 538.
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signing.
The court implies that the standard forms used in real estate
transactions are unfair. Also, the court implies that even if the parties did read the provision in the contract, they did not understand
it. If the parties had understood the provision, the court suggests
that the parties would have reasonably estimated the potential
damages should either party breach the contract, and the parties
then would have modified the form accordingly. 10
In light of the court's holding in Weber, real estate companies
doing business in Montana should consider redrafting their standard form purchase contract to provide clearer notice of liquidated
damages provisions and the consequences of these provisions. Real
estate companies might consider providing their Montana agents
with a variation of the forms used in California. In California, a
statute requires that a liquidated damages "provision in a contract
to purchase and sell real property . . . [be] separately signed or
initialed by each party . . .[and be] set out either in at least 10point bold type or in contrasting red print in at least eight-point
bold type.' 10 5 "Flagging" a liquidated damages provision in this
manner may provide clearer notice to the parties. However, the
parties must also "attempt to determine [in advance] what the actual damages might be" to meet the requirements of Weber. 0 6
This latter requirement might be satisfied by leaving blank the
amount in the damages provision for the parties to reasonably
estimate.
The significant change required in the area of liquidated damages law, specifically in the real estate context, can most appropriately be addressed by the legislature. The Montana Legislature
should consider amending section 28-2-721 of the Montana Code
to include the additional requirement of Morgen & Osgood: that
the amount specified in a liquidated damages provision be a reasonable estimate of the actual damages. Montana adopted its present statutory scheme from California in 1895.10 Considering that
several years ago California abandoned the statutory liquidated
damages scheme upon which Montana now relies,10 8 Montana legislators might turn to California's current statutory scheme for
104.
105.
106.

See id. at 200-01, 841 P.2d at 537-38.
CAL.CIv. CODE § 1677 (West 1985).
Weber, 255 Mont. at 201, 841 P.2d at 538.
107. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-721 (1991).
108. See Michael J. Mais & Paul B. Martins, Comment, Title 4.5: California Liquidated Damages, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 967 & n.1 (1979) ("The [1978] enactment
amended six statutes, repealed two others, and added two more statutes to the body of
California liquidated damages law.").
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insight. 0 9
VI.

CRIMINAL LAW

A. State v. Allen: Impractical, Inconvenient, or
Immaterial?-Montana'sExigency Requirement for Warrantless
Automobile Searches
The issue before the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Allen' 10 centered on whether the warrantless stop and search of the
defendant's vehicles violated his constitutional rights."' The
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as
Article II, section 11 of the Montana Constitution, provide that individuals shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures." 2
In Allen the court held that neither constitutional provision was
violated because the officers' actions were justified based on probable cause and exigent circumstances."'
The Montana Supreme Court's conclusion in Allen is flawed
for several reasons. First, the court failed to distinguish Montana's
"automobile exception" (and accompanying exigency requirement)
from its federal counterpart. Second, the court defined exigent circumstances so broadly that it rendered the exigency requirement
virtually immaterial. Third, the court's reliance on California v.
Acevedo" 4 was misplaced. Finally, the court failed to note that the
warrantless search in Allen produced no evidence to suppress.
In the early afternoon on April 9, 1990, the defendant's daughter-in-law informed the Kalispell Police Department that the defendant would be returning that evening from out of state with a
shipment of marijuana. The informant described the defendant's
vehicle and the manner in which he concealed the marijuana in
spare tires. After eight hours on stakeout, two police officers
stopped the defendant's truck. The officers held the defendant at
gunpoint on the reasonable belief that he might resist while they
searched him, the truck, and the vehicle being towed. The officers
109. While the California statutes provide Montana legislators a point of departure,
they are fraught with difficulties themselves. See id. at 998-1001 (noting inherent ambiguities in California's 1978 enactments); Jeffrey B. Coopersmith, Comment, Refocusing Liquidated Damages Law for Real Estate Contracts: Returning to the Historical Roots of the
Penalty Doctrine, 39 EMORY L.J. 267, 294-99 (1990) (discussing the drawbacks of California's liquidated damages statutory scheme while proposing that Georgia adopt somewhat
similar provisions).
110. Mont. -,
844 P.2d 105 (1992).
111. Id. at __
844 P.2d at 106.
112. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 11.
113. Allen, __ Mont. at -,
844 P.2d at 108-10.
114. 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
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read the defendant his Miranda rights and informed him that
while he was not yet under arrest, they would be impounding his
vehicles. A search of the towed vehicle by a police dog at the scene
corroborated earlier information on where the marijuana would be
stored. However, this initial search produced no real evidence. The
officers then drove the defendant to his home where they searched
his home and seized a tire iron discovered in the defendant's basement. The State contended the defendant verbally consented to all
searches. The defendant denied giving any consent. "'
Section 46-5-101 of the Montana Code requires law enforcement officers to obtain a search warrant whenever a search is made
of a person, object, or place unless the search is in accordance with
recognized exceptions. "' To satisfy the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement in Montana, the State must satisfy two
prongs: "(1) the existence of probable cause to search; and (2) the
presence of exigent circumstances, that is, that it was not practicable under the circumstances to obtain a warrant.'

7

In contrast,

.the federal common law automobile exception
to the warrant re8
quirement requires probable cause only."

The exigency requirement of the federal automobile exception
was largely eliminated by the United States Supreme Court for
two reasons. The Supreme Court enunciated long ago the first and
more practical reason-that the automobile's mobility enabled evidence in an automobile to be quickly transported outside the jurisdiction."' More recently, when the Court's mobility rationale appeared weakened by the facts presented in Chambers v. Maroney,
the Court announced that an individual's expectancy of privacy
20
was lower in an automobile than in the individual's home.1
In Allen the court wrongly found satisfied the second prong of
Montana's automobile exception-exigent circumstances. 2 ' In
support of this finding, the State's argument was essentially two115. Allen, Mont. at -,
844 P.2d at 106-07.
116. "A search of a person, object, or place may be made and evidence, contraband,
and persons may be seized in accordance with Title 46 when a search is made: (1) by the
authority of a search warrant; or (2) in accordance with recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement." MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-101 (1991).
117. Allen,
Mont. at __, 844 P.2d at 108 (citing State v. Cripps, 177 Mont. 410,
422, 582 P.2d 312, 319 (1978).
118. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985); Colorado v. Bannister, 449
U.S. 1, 3 (1980) (per curiam); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 463-64 (1971);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1925).
119. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
120. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 49-52 (1970). See also Carney, 471 U.S. at
391-92.
121. Allen, - Mont. at -,
844 P.2d at 109-10.
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fold. First, insufficient time existed for the police officers to secure
a warrant. Second, an insufficient number of officers were available
to safely conduct the search if one were released to secure a warrant.1"' The facts, however, indicate otherwise.
The police officers had sufficient time to secure a warrant. The
informant contacted the police early Saturday afternoon saying
"the defendant would arrive some time during the evening. "123 The
stakeout began at 5:00 p.m. The police officers stopped defendant
at approximately 2:00 a.m. The police officer "testified that obtaining a search warrant on [the weekend] would have taken approximately four hours."' 12' It is highly probable that had the officer sought a warrant early in the afternoon, immediately after
establishing probable cause, the officer would have had the warrant
in hand before setting up the stakeout or shortly thereafter. Additionally, the officers had sufficient time to obtain a warrant even if
an officer had pursued a warrant when the stakeout began at 5:00
p.m. The dissent suggests that the reason the officers did not follow the weekend procedure to secure a warrant was inconvenience
12 5
rather than the impracticability required by law.
Despite the police officers' belief that "it was 'more important'
to set up the stakeout than to obtain a warrant,""'2 a sufficient
number officers were available to pursue both. According to the officer in charge, because of the defendant's potential dangerousness,
more than one officer was needed at the stakeout.'12 Yet, after
more than eight hours on stakeout, the third officer was permitted
28
to go home and rest.'
In finding that the warrantless stop and search did not violate
the defendant's constitutional rights, the Montana Supreme Court
in Allen relied heavily on California v. Acevedo. 129 The court's reliance, however, is misplaced. In Acevedo the police officers had
probable cause to search a container that the defendant had placed
in the trunk of his automobile.' 30 The United States Supreme
Court held in Acevedo that the officers' subsequent stop of the defendant's vehicle and search of the container were constitutional
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at -,
844 P.2d
Id. at
844 P.2d
Id.at __ 844 P.2d
Id. at -,
844 P.2d
Id. at -,
844 P.2d
Id. at
844 P.2d
Id. at -, 844 P.2d
Id. at -,
844 P.2d
Acevedo, 111 S. Ct.

at 109.
at 110.
at 110.
at 111 (Gray, J., dissenting).
at 111 (Gray, J., dissenting).
at 109.
at 107.
at 109-10.
at 1991.
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based on United States v. Ross,13 ' which enables officers with
probable cause to stop and search "every part of the vehicle and its
contents that may conceal the object of the search."1 3
In choosing to follow Ross, the Supreme Court in Acevedo
abandoned a conflicting line of cases based on United States v.
Chadwick'3" and Arkansas v. Sanders.1" The Chadwick-Sanders
line of cases held that the police could seize a closed container obtained in a warrantless vehicle search where probable cause focused on the container alone. 135 However, the police could not conduct a warrantless search of the container because people retain a
legitimate expectation of privacy in closed containers.' 3 6
The problem with the Montana Supreme Court's reliance on
Acevedo lies in the premise upon which both Acevedo and Ross are
based. Acevedo and Ross involved the special problem of opening
containers during an otherwise lawful warrantless search.' 3 7 Those
warrantless searches were lawful because under the United States
Constitution, the Supreme Court held "the police may search without a warrant if their search is supported by probable cause."' 38 In
Allen, however, a lawful warrantless search did not exist because
under Montana law probable cause alone, which the Montana Supreme Court found,'3 9 is not enough to stop and search a vehicle or
containers within a vehicle. Exigent circumstances must also exist,' 40 which appeared lacking in Allen.
The court failed to clearly state that under the Montana Constitution the automobile exception is a higher standard, requiring
exigent circumstances in addition to probable cause,"' than the2
automobile exception under the United States Constitution."1
However, at least two Montana Supreme Court decisions prior to
Allen also failed to acknowledge Montana's higher standard."' In
fact, the court in State v. Broell said that if probable cause exists
131. Id.
132. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).

133. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
134. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
135. Id. at 761-66 (citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13).
136. Id. at 764-66.

137. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1991; Ross, 456 U.S. at 825.
138. Acevedo, 111 S.Ct. at 1991.
139. Allen, - Mont. at -,
844 P.2d at 108-09.
140. Id. at -,
844 P.2d at 109-10.
141. Id. at -,
844 P.2d at 108 (citing Cripps, 177 Mont. at 422,, 582 P.2d at 319;
State v. Arnor, 164 Mont. 182, 184-85, 520 P.2d 773, 775 (1974); and Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
458-64-all of which are pre-Carney cases).
142. Carney, 471 U.S. at 392.
143. See State v. Broell, 249 Mont. 117, 122-23, 814 P.2d 44, 47 (1991); State v. Evjen,
234 Mont. 516, 519-20, 765 P.2d 708, 710-11 (1988).
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"to believe such automobile's contents 'offend against the law,'" a
warrantless automobile search or seizure is valid."' Possibly no
real distinction exists between the federal and state automobile exception to warrant requirement. Perhaps Justice Scalia's remarks
in his concurrence in Acevedo ring true for Montana as well:
"There can be no clarity in this area unless we make up our minds,
and unless the principles we express comport with the actions we
take." 4 5
The Montana Supreme Court attempted to clarify this area
when it quoted the clear-cut rule of Acevedo to support the proposition that one rule now governs automobile searches under both
federal and state law. 4" The confusion that the Court in Acevedo
intended to resolve with "one clear-cut rule" involved the distinction "between a container for which the police are specifically
1 47
searching and a container which they come across in a car.9
That clear-cut rule governs the special problem of opening containers in automobile searches. But in Allen no special problem of
opening containers existed because the officers in Allen followed
the Chadwick-Sanders rule, not Ross, by immediately seizing the
vehicles and their closed containers-the spare tires-and later
seeking the necessary search warrant to search the vehicles and
48
their containers-the spare tires.1
Finally, that the officers did not search the containers until a
warrant was secured raises the question of what evidence of the
warrantless search the defendant sought to suppress. The warrantless search or "investigatory stop" of the defendant's vehicles in
the early hours of April 8, 1990, produced no evidence to suppress.' 49 The police later obtained the incriminating evidence pursuant to a warrant.'5 0 Thus, the court did not need to look any
5
further in affirming the district court decision.' '
144. Broell, 249 Mont. at 122, 814 P.2d at 47 (citing Evjen, 234 Mont. at 519-20, 765
P.2d at 711).
145. Acevedo, 1i1 S. Ct. at 1993.
146. Allen, Mont. at __,
844 P.2d at 110.
147. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. at 1988.
148.

Allen,

-

Mont. at -,

844 P.2d at 107.

149. Id. at
844 P.2d at 107.
150. Id. at -, 844 P.2d at 107.
151. See Broell, 249 Mont. at 123, 814 P.2d at 47, where the court noted that:
even if we were to conclude that [the defendant's] car was unlawfully seized, we
still would not find error in the denial of the motion to suppress. Evidence secured
from an impounded automobile will not be suppressed when such automobile is
searched pursuant to a warrant that is based on information wholly independent
of the seizure:
"The items were secured during a search conducted pursuant to a warrant."
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Nonetheless, in State v. Allen the Montana Supreme Court
rendered the exigent circumstances prong of the automobile exception to the general warrant requirement virtually immaterial. Following Allen, to stop and search a person's vehicle and the containers found therein, the police must have both probable cause
and exigent circumstances. However, exigent circumstances may
exist in Montana if law enforcement officers determine that securing a warrant would be impracticable or even inconvenient.' 5
B. State v. Davis: Is the Confrontation Clause Satisfied by an
Opaque Screen?
In State v. Davis'"3 the Montana Supreme Court considered
whether placing an opaque screen between the defendant and the
child witnesses violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 5 ' The court held
that the trial court did not err in permitting the opaque screen
between the defendant and the child witnesses while testifying.
The court relied on the district court's individualized finding of
necessity.' 55
According to school officials, the child, J.R., appeared unhealthy and regularly came to school dirty. J.R.'s teacher described
J.R. as "emotionally underdeveloped." A social worker interviewed
J.R., a kindergartner, for the second time, at the request of J.R.'s
teacher. During the interview J.R. explained how her babysitter
sexually assaulted her. The social worker placed J.R. in a foster
home the next day. The following day, J.R. identified the defendant in a photographic lineup. Two weeks later the police arrested
the defendant. 156
Prior to trial the district court granted the State's motion to
place a temporary opaque screen between the defendant and the
witness stand during the child witnesses' testimony at trial. The
screen's placement allowed the judge and both counsel, but not the
defendant, to view the child witnesses. The defendant objected to
the screen's placement between him and the child witnesses on the
ground that it violated his federal constitutional right to confront
the witnesses against him. 57 The district court found the defend844 P.2d at 111 (Gray, J., dissenting).
152. Allen, Mont. at -,
153. 253 Mont. 50, 830 P.2d 1309 (1992).
154. Id. at 52, 830 P.2d at 1311.
155. Id. at 56-59, 830 P.2d at 1314-15.
156. Id. at 52-53, 830 P.2d at 1311.
157. Id. at 54, 830 P.2d at 1312. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
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ant guilty.1 58
The majority in Davis began its analysis by noting that the
defendant failed to preserve his right of review on appeal with respect to violation of Article II, section 24 of the Montana Constitution because he merely objected at trial based on the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution.'5 9 Justice
Trieweiler's special concurrence intimates that had the defendant's
objection been based on the Montana Constitution, the outcome of
the court's decision in Davis would have been different. 160
The dissent in Davis suggests,' 6 ' as do the United States Supreme Court decisions upon which the majority in Davis relied,
that the outcome of Davis would have been different if heard by
the United States Supreme Court. In Davis, the Montana Supreme
Court juxtaposed two relatively recent United States Supreme
Court decisions-Coy v. Iowa" 2 and Maryland v. Craig."3 In Coy,
the more analogous of the two cases, the United States Supreme
Court considered for the first time the constitutionality of special
procedures employed to protect child witnesses in sex abuse cases
from the potential for trauma involved in facing the alleged perpetrator in open court."" In Coy, the witnesses, two thirteen-year-old
girls, testified behind a screen that enabled the judge, jury, and
both counsel to view the witnesses while blocking the witnesses'
view of the defendant. Special lighting, however, enabled the defendant to view the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified.
Additionally, the format used allowed the jury to consider the defendant's demeanor. Nevertheless, the Court held that the screening procedure employed in Coy violated the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.' 6 5
Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion in Coy and applied a literal face-to-face meaning to the Confrontation Clause.
The Court indicated that the Sixth Amendment's "irreducible literal meaning" of confrontation could be avoided "when necessary
to further an important public policy."'6 6 However, the Court qual• . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
158. Davis, 253 Mont. at 53, 830 P.2d at 1312.
159. Id. at 54, 830 P.2d at 1312. Article II, section 24 of the Montana Constitution
states in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right. . . to
meet the witnesses against him face to face." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 24.
160. Davis, 253 Mont. at 61-62, 830 P.2d at 1317.
161. Id. at 62-63, 830 P.2d at 1317-18 (McDonough, J., dissenting).
162. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
163. 497 U.S. 836.
164. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014-15.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1021-22.
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ified this exception to the literal face-to-face meaning of the Confrontation Clause by requiring more than implied legislative intent.
According to the Court, to invoke this exception requires an "individualized finding that ...
particular witnesses need[] special
protection."'""
In Craig the lower court's individualized finding that the child
witnesses needed special protection satisfied the qualified public
policy exception of Coy. 168 The lower court believed that the witnesses, as victims, would have suffered severe trauma in an opencourt confrontation. The lower court in Craig allowed the witnesses to testify by one-way closed circuit television.6 9 In Davis
the Montana Supreme Court followed the requisite Confrontation
Clause elements set forth by the Craig majority: physical presence,
oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier
of fact.' 7 ° The defendant's ability to observe the witnesses testifying against him, while present in Coy through the use of special
lighting and present in Craig through the use of one-way closed
circuit television, did not exist in Davis."" The court in Davis
found this distinction irrelevant, however, since the "basic" Confrontation Clause elements were present.'7 2
In Davis the majority's understanding of the Confrontation
Clause elements enunciated in Craig seems narrow.'13 As noted by
the dissent in Davis,'7 4 the Court in Craig specifically set forth
other requisite elements of the Confrontation Clause, including the
defendant's ability "to view (albeit by video monitor) the demeanor (and body) of the witness as he or she testified.' ' 75 The
dissent in Davis found the defendant's inability to view the child
witnesses while testifying distinguishable from both Craig and its
predecessor, Coy. The dissent also found this distinction disposi77
tive in Davis. ' 6 Federal case law supports the dissent.'
Montana law expressly provides an alternative that may minimize the difficulties arising from the potentially traumatic experience for a child witness testifying against the assailant in open
167.
168.

Id. at 1021.
Craig, 497 U.S. at 860.

169. Id. at 840-43.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Davis, 253 Mont. at 56-58, 830 P.2d at 1314-15.
Id. at 62, 830 P.2d at 1317 (McDonough, J., dissenting).
Id. at 58, 830 P.2d at 1314-15.
See id. at 62-63, 830 P.2d at 1317-18 (McDonough, J., dissenting).
Id. at 63, 830 P.2d at 1318 (McDonough, J., dissenting).
Craig, 497 U.S. at 851.
Davis, 253 Mont. at 62-63, 830 P.2d at 1317-18.
See Craig, 497 U.S. at 857; Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020-22.
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court.1 78 The Montana alternative-previously videotaped testimony presentable at trial-is grounded in the hearsay exception of
unavailable witnesses, another exception to the Confrontation
Clause. Unfortunately, the statute may fall short in dealing with
the delicate balance between granting the defendant the right to
confront those testifying against him and the public policy concerns over the potentially traumatic experience for the child
witness.
Under the current Montana videotaped testimony statute, the
victim and prosecution may request the videotaping of testimony,
and that testimony must be admitted into evidence at trial if it
conforms to all applicable procedural and evidentiary rules of the
state.1 79 However, the videotaped testimony statute expressly
states that the defendant "be allowed to attend the videotape proceedings."1 80 The question becomes one of meaning. Yet to be determined is whether "attend" will be construed literally to mean
face-to-face or liberally to include mere presence in the same room
without benefit of observation.
Justice Trieweiler stated that "it is clear to [him] that the
same result could not occur" under Article II, section 24 of the
Montana Constitution. 181 For this reason Justice Trieweiler "encourage[d] prosecutors. . . to try to find some way to protect child
victims which does not preclude the defendant from observing
their demeanor and testimony while it is being given."18 The solution to Justice Trieweiler's suggestion lies in the Maryland statute
at issue in Craig.18 However, Montana has no statutory authorization for live video testimony, as employed in Craig, allowing the
witness to testify during trial from another room in the courthouse.1 84 With the use of live video testimony, the difficulties asso178. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-216(1) (1991) which states in part: "[T]he testimony of the victim . . . may be recorded by means of videotape for presentation at trial.
The recorded testimony may be presented at trial. The recorded testimony may be
presented at trial and must be received into evidence. The victim need not be physically
present in the courtroom when the videotape is admitted into evidence."
179. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-216(2) states: "The procedural and evidentiary rules of
the state that are applicable to criminal trials within the state apply to the videotape proceedings authorized by this section."
180. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-216(3) (1991) states: "The district court judge, the
prosecutor, the victim, the defendant, the defendant's attorney, and other persons as are
considered necessary by the court to make the recordings authorized under this section
must be allowed to attend the videotape proceedings."
181. Davis, 253 Mont at 61, 830 P.2d at 1317 (Trieweiler, J., special concurrence to the
majority opinion he authored).
182. Id. at 61-62, 830 P.2d at 1317.
183. Craig, 497 U.S. at 840-41 n.1.
184. At the time of the Craig decision, Maryland's statutory procedure provided:
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ciated with testifying in open court could be reduced. Moreover, all
Confrontation Clause requirements delineated in Craig appear satisfied with the use of live video testimony: the witness would be
physically present, under oath, subject to cross-examination, and
observable by the trier of fact. Likewise, the defendant would be
85
able to observe the witness's demeanor.1
The opaque screen placed between the defendant and the
child witnesses in Davis denied the defendant the ability to view
the witnesses' demeanor during questioning. This prohibited the
defendant from informing defense counsel of any tell-tale gestures
of dishonesty unique to the witnesses. However, under the Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of Coy and Craig, the opaque
screen did not violate the defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him under the United States Constitution. Consequently, in Davis the Montana Supreme Court erred in its interpretation and application of federal Confrontation Clause law.
To prevent future violations of the accused's right to confron(a) (1) In a case of abuse of a child as defined in § 5-701 of the Family Law
Article or Article 27, § 35A of the Code, a court may order that the testimony of a
child victim be taken outside the courtroom and shown in the courtroom by
means of closed circuit television if: (i) The testimony is taken during the proceeding; and
(ii) The judge determines that testimony by the child victim in the courtroom
will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.
(2) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, and the
judge may question the child.
(3) The operators of the closed circuit television shall make every effort to be
unobtrusive.
(b) (1) Only the following persons may be in the room with the child when the
child testifies by closed circuit television:
(i) The prosecuting attorney;
(ii) The attorney for the defendant;
(iii) The operators of the closed circuit television equipment; and
(iv) Unless the defendant objects, any person whose presence, in the opinion
of the court, contributes to the well-being of the child, including a person who has
dealt with the child in a therapeutic setting concerning the abuse.
(2) During the child's testimony by closed circuit television, the judge and the
defendant shall be in the courtroom.
(3) The judge and the defendant shall be allowed to communicate with the
persons in the room where the child is testifying by any appropriate electronic
method.
(c) The provisions of this section do not apply if the defendant is an attorney
pro se.
(d) This section may not be interpreted to preclude, for purposes of identification of a defendant, the presence of both the victim and the defendant in the
courtroom at the same time.
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1989).
185. Craig, 497 U.S. at 857.
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tation, prosecutors should consider the use of previously recorded
testimony of child witnesses, if appropriate under section 46-16216, or, following an independent finding of necessity, live videotape testimony like that upheld in Craig. Furthermore, the legislature should consider either adopting a statutory procedure similar
to that of Maryland or modifying section 46-16-216 of the Montana Code to include live videotape testimony.
C.

State v. Fertterer: Prosecutors Given Discretion to Prosecute
Fish and Game Violations Under Title 45 Criminal Laws

In State v. Fertterers6 the Montana Supreme Court expanded
Title 45's concept of property to include wild game within the
scope of public property. Additionally, the court again endorsed
prosecutorial discretion to select among various criminal charges,
this time by subjecting fish and game violators to prosecution
under either Title 45, the Montana Criminal Code, or Title 87, the
Montana fish and game statutes, despite what some might consider
apparent legislative attempts to specifically enumerate fish and
game violations solely within Title 87.187
In Fertterer following a Department of Fish, Wildlife, and
Park's ten-month undercover investigation into the defendants'
large-scale poaching operation in Montana, the defendants were
tried and convicted of multiple counts of Title 45 felony criminal
mischief and Title 87 misdemeanor fish and game violations.' 8 8 At
the time, Title 87 provided only for misdemeanor penalties, although the legislature has since amended Title 87 to include felony
penalties as well. 8 9 Had the defendants been tried and convicted
186. 255 Mont. 73, 841 P.2d 467 (1992).
187. Id. at 79-82, 841 P.2d at 471-72.
188. Id. at 76, 841 P.2d at 468-69. More specifically, the defendants were convicted of
the following:
The jury convicted Richard Fertterer of two counts of felony criminal mischief for illegally killing three elk, six deer and three antelope. It also convicted
him of several misdemeanors under Title 87, MCA, including: two counts of outfitting without a license; two counts of unlawfully selling, transporting and possessing game; two counts of hunting with aid of artificial light; and one count of unlawfully trapping game animals.
Likewise the jury convicted David John Fertterer of two counts of felony
criminal mischief for unlawfully killing one mountain lion and three elk. He was
also convicted of several misdemeanors under Title 87, MCA, including: guiding
without a license, unlawful sale or possession of game, hunting with aid of artificial light, and unlawful trapping of game animals.
Id. at 76, 841 P.2d at 469.
189. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-3-118(3) (1991) (titled "Sale or possession of unlawfully taken wildlife-penalty) which states: "A person who violates this section is guilty of a
felony .... "
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for their offenses solely under Title 87, their penalties would have
been limited to fines of "not less than $300 or more than $1,000,
[imprisonment] in the county jail for not more than [six] months,
or both." 19 0 However, by subjecting the defendants to Title 45 felony criminal mischief convictions, the defendants' potential penalties increased significantly to a maximum fine of $50,000, imprisonment "in the state prison for [a] term not to exceed [ten] years,
or both."' 9 1
The defendants claimed on appeal that: (1) wild animals are
not property or public property within the meaning of Montana's
Title 45 Criminal Code, (2) Title 87 provides the exclusive remedy
for the illegal taking of game, and (3) the criminal mischief statute,
as applied to the defendants, is unconstitutionally vague. 192 The
Montana Supreme Court denied the defendants relief on all three
issues.' 3
Title 45, chapter 6 of the 1973 Criminal Code (titled "Offenses
Against Property") consolidates numerous common law and statutory offenses into a few broadly defined criminal statutes. Section
45-6-101 of the Montana Code states: "A person commits the offense of criminal mischief if he knowingly or purposely . . . injures, damages, or destroys any property of another or public prop".'..,
To convict the defendants of felony
erty without consent .
criminal mischief, therefore, the State had to show that the elk,
deer, antelope, and mountain lion poached by the defendants were
"property of another" or "public property." Since public property
is not defined by the Criminal Code, much of the court's discussion
of whether wildlife is public property or property of another centered on the theft statute concepts of ownership. Through a rather
attenuated reading of the section 45-6-101 and despite what may
be contrary intent, 1 95 the court extended the theft definitions of
ownership to the crime of criminal mischief. 196 While noting that
the Montana Supreme Court has long recognized the power of the
190.
191.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-102(2)(b) (1989).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-101(3) (1991).

192. Fertterer,255 Mont. at 76, 841 P.2d at 468.
193. Id. at 80-83, 841 P.2d at 471-73.
194. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-101(1)(a) (1991).
195. The Compiler's Comments (Annotator's Note) indicate that the definition of
property of another "relates to Theft and Related Offenses (MCA, 45-6-301 through 45-6327)" to permit "prosecution for theft of jointly-owned property." MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2101(55) compiler's comments (1991). But see State v. Palmer, 207 Mont. 152, 160-61, 673
P.2d 1234, 1238-39 (1983) (stating that Compiler's Comments do not have the force of law
and are "clearly misleading").
196. Fertterer,255 Mont. at 77-78, 841 P.2d at 469-70.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol54/iss2/10

32

Recent Developments
in Montana Law
1993] Hamill and Staley:
RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS

State "to regulate game animals,' 1 97 the court continued to avoid
the question of whether the public property interest protected by
the criminal mischief statute was based on the State's title ownership interest or regulatory interest. Regardless, the court found the
State's interest superior to that of the defendants.'9 8
After determining that section 45-6-101 includes wildlife as
"property of another" or "public property," the court addressed
whether the legislature intended that fish and game violations be
prosecuted exclusively under Title 87 or, alternatively, under both
Title 87 and Title 45.199 Although the court has not addressed this
question head on with regard to fish and game statutes, the court
has, in prior instances, approved of similar prosecutorial discretion
when selecting between criminal charges to bring against a defendant found under different titles of the Montana Code.20 0 The su197. Id. at 79, 841 P.2d at 470-71. See also State v. Jack, 167 Mont. 456, 459-60, 539
P.2d 726, 728 (1975):
There is no question that a state has the power to preserve and regulate its
wildlife. In the nineteenth century, it was commonly held that this power derived
from the common law concept of "sovereign ownership". Under that doctrine, the
ownership of wildlife was held by the state in trust for its people. Under more
modern theory, the power has been held to lie within the purview of a state's
police powers.
Montana recognizes both the doctrine of sovereign ownership and the police
power theory. We need not decide which of these doctrines should now prevail in
the state of Montana. In the area of wildlife regulation, it is sufficient to state the
legislature may impose such terms and conditions as it sees fit, as long as constitutional limitations are not infringed.
Jack, 167 Mont. at 459-60, 539 P.2d at 728 (citations omitted).
198. Fertterer,255 Mont. at 80, 841 P.2d at 469-71 (discussing both the state's "ownership" of wildlife and the state's "superior interest" in wildlife concluding "the State has a
superior interest under the ownership theory and also has such an interest by virtue of its
police power to regulate the taking of game" which "regulatory power was derived from the
states' 'title ownership' in the game, and also from the states' police power").
199. Id. at 81, 841 P.2d at 471-72.
200. See State v. Duncan, 181 Mont. 382, 395-96, 593 P.2d 1026, 1034 (1979) (approving prosecution of defendant "under section [30-10-301], the specific fraudulent securities
practices statute, rather than section [45-6-317], the general deceptive practices statute").
The court again declined to apply the civil rule of statutory construction that "a more specific statute controls over an inconsistent general statute, '. : . to criminal prosecutions
where defendant's conduct violated' two or more criminal statutes." Id. at 395, 593 P.2d at
1034 (quoting State v. Moore, 174 Mont. 292, 297, 570 P.2d 580, 583 (1977)). The court in
both Duncan and Moore quoted the following language from State v. Lagerquist, 152 Mont.
21, 30-31, 445 P.2d 910, 915 (1968):
The fact that the legislature provides a course of action by more than one statute
allows the state to choose either applicable law... "The fact that there is an area
in which two statutes overlap and prohibit the same act . . . does not mean that
the defendant can only be prosecuted under the statute providing for the lesser
penalty."
See also State v. Brady, 249 Mont. 290, 295-96, 816 P.2d 413, 416 (1991) (upholding prosecutor's discretion to charge aggravated kidnapping rather than domestic abuse "where all of
the elements of aggravated kidnaping were present in the case presented by the State").
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preme court adopted the lower court's holding that the language of
section 87-1-102 of the Montana Code does not evidence a clear
intent to provide an exclusive remedy for fish and game violations
under Title 87.201
However, the court's statement that "none of the sections of
Title 87 comprehensively define the [defendants'] conduct," 0 2 is
misplaced in that it ignores section 87-1-102(2)(b), which specifically sets forth the legislature's intent that conduct like the defendants' at that time results in a misdemeanor violation.2 0° Absent express legislative intent to provide exclusive remedies for
violations of other areas of law, defendants may find themselves
prosecuted under specific as well as general statutes. The court in
Fertterer leaves prosecutors to choose among a panoply of crimes
established by the legislature.
Finally, in Fertterer,the court discussed the defendants' claim
that the criminal mischief statute is unconstitutionally vague as
applied to their conduct.2 0° Having found that wild game is included within the criminal mischief statute's definition of property
and, therefore, considered public property,2 0 5 the court quickly dismissed the defendants' vagueness claim, finding that "reasonable
persons would have realized that the conduct of destroying wild
animals without the consent of the State, specifically violated [section] 45-6-101(1)(a)." 2 °e This assumes that the reasonable person
did not look to Title 87 as the exclusive remedy for the crime committed. Taking the court's reasoning one step further, reasonable
persons who commit acts similar to those committed by the defendants are now on notice that they may be in violation of other
criminal statutes relying on the same definitions as section 45-6201. Fertterer,255 Mont. at 81, 841 P.2d at 472.
202. Id. at 81, 841 P.2d at 472.
203. "A person convicted of unlawfully taking, killing, possessing, or transporting a
deer, antelope, elk, mountain lion, or black bear or any part of these animals or wasting a
deer, antelope, or elk shall be fined not less than $300 or more than $1,000, imprisoned in
the county jail for not more than 6 months, or both." MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-1-102(2)(b)
(1989). Neither the majority nor the three-justice dissent discuss this section (MONT. CODE
ANN. § 87-1-102(b) (1989)).
204. Fertterer,255 Mont. at 82-83, 841 P.2d at 472-73.
205. The Annotator's Notes to section 45-6-101 state:
The 1975 amendment inserted "or public property" after "property of another" in
subdivisions (1)(a) . . . . There was some question whether public property was
included in the original statute because "property of another" was defined as
property in which another person had an interest (§45-2-101). The amendment
was intended to make certain that property owned by any governmental entity or
agency, or any other public body is within the protection of the statute.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-101 annotator's notes (1991) (second emphasis added).
206. Fertterer,255 Mont. at 82, 841 P.2d at 472.
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101, for example, Montana's felony theft statute."' 7
The court's decision in Fertterer is significant because the
court has again endorsed prosecutorial discretion to select between
various criminal statutes based on differences in potential penalties to be imposed. Of additional significance, wild game is now
considered "property" and, more specifically, "public property"
within the meaning of Title 45, chapter 6. To avoid having prosecutors pursue Title 87 fish and game violations under Title 45
criminal statutes, the legislature must explicitly address the issue
of whether it intended that Title 87 provide the exclusive remedy
for fish and game violations.
D. State v. Valley: The Probable Cause Confusion Continues:
Without Adequate Police Corroboration,Anonymous Citizen
Informants are Not Presumed Reliable
On April 1, 1988, detectives with the County Sheriff's Department searched the defendant's residence pursuant to a warrant issued by the district court. The issuing judge found probable cause
based on: (1) two recent anonymous crimestopper tips provided by
the same individual claiming the defendant sold marijuana; (2) police verification of the location described by the crimestopper tipster; and (3) three earlier occasions where other informants
claimed the defendant was involved in growing, selling, or otherwise distributing marijuana. The detectives discovered sufficient
evidence of crime in the defendant's residence, which the defendant later moved to suppress. 08
Following a suppression hearing, the district court held that
the three earlier informant claims "were in and of themselves too
remote," but that the recent crimestopper tips were not so remote
and served, in part, as the basis for probable cause.2 09 The district
court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress was "based on
[the Montana Supreme] Court's application of the 'totality of the
circumstances' [or Gates] test"2' 0 as applied in State v. Rydberg211
On appeal the Montana Supreme Court concluded "that the application for the warrant did not [c]ontain sufficient facts and circumstances under the Gates test" and, therefore, reversed the district court's decision. 1 2
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See generally MoNT. CODE

ANN. § 45-6-301 (1991).
State v. Valley, 252 Mont. 489, 490-92, 830 P.2d 1255, 1256-57 (1992).
Id. at 492, 830 P.2d at 1257.
Id.
239 Mont. 70, 72-73, 778 P.2d 902, 903-04 (1989).
Valley, 252 Mont. at 494, 830 P.2d at 1258.
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According to section 46-5-221 of the Montana Code, the application for a search warrant should "state facts sufficient to support
probable cause "213 as determined by a "neutral and detached"
judge21 4 before a judge issues a search warrant. Thus, the judge's
first consideration should be what information supports the probable cause requirement. Often information provided by informants
comes into question at this point for two reasons: (1) the evidence
is hearsay, 1 8 or (2) criminal informants may have ulterior
motives.21
The traditional test employed to decide whether to consider
information provided by informants derives from Aguilar v.
Texas.2 17 The Aguilar test requires that the issuing judge be satisfied with both the underlying basis for the informant's knowledge
and the general veracity of that knowledge.2 18 This latter prong
might include consideration of the informant's credibility and the
reasonableness of the applicant's reliance thereon. 1 9 In Spinelli v.
United States,2 ° the Supreme Court, in interpreting the first
prong of the Aguilar test, decided that basis of knowledge may be
inferred if the information provided in the affidavit is sufficiently
detailed.22
The Supreme Court set forth the current totality of the circumstances test in Illinois v. Gates. 2 In Gates the Court held
that a partially corroborated anonymous informant's letter describing in detail a drug deal failed to meet the Aguilar-Spinelli test
but, in light of the totality of circumstances, probable cause exMONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-221 (1991) provides:
A judge shall issue a search warrant to a person upon application, in writing
or by telephone, made under oath or affirmation, that:
(1) states facts sufficient to support probable cause to believe that an offense
has been committed;

213.

(2) states facts sufficient to support probable cause to believe that evidence,
contraband, or persons connected with the offense may be found;
(3) particularly describes the place, object, or persons to be searched; and
(4) particularly describes who or what is to be seized.
214. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). See also United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964) (stating that a judge is
not neutral and detached if merely a "rubber stamp for the police").
215. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
216. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 254 Mont. 425, 430-31, 838 P.2d 427, 430-31 (1992)
(denying defendant's request to identify confidential informants based on his unsupported
claim that his wife and daughter previously spurned the informants' sexual advances).
217. 378 U.S. 108.
218. Id. at 114.
219. See id.
220. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
221. Id. at 416-17.
222. 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983).
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isted to issue the warrant nonetheless.22 In abandoning the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the Court in Gates characterized the determination of whether probable cause exists as difficult to define in
technical terms and difficult to restrain within mechanical legal
tests. Rather, the Court found probable cause centers on common
sense and on "the factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act."' Under the Gates test, a judge considering whether probable cause exists must balance "the relative weights of all the various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant's tip, ' " 5 including that information relevant under the
technical test of Aguilar-Spinelli." '
In Valley the Montana Supreme Court found that the anonymous crimestopper tips lacked the necessary basis of knowledge,
credibility, and independent corroboration to establish probable
cause." ' While the district court appears to have applied the Gates
test, the supreme court's application of that same test is, in reality,
more akin to the technical Aguilar-Spinelli test. For example, the
court applied the first prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test in noting
that the anonymous informant "gave no basis for his knowledge."228 Similarly, the court's application of the second prong of
veracity becomes apparent when the court highlights that the
anonymous informant failed to provide "such detail that the information became self-verifying or was able to be sufficiently
corroborated. "229
The Court in Gates abandoned the rigid Aguilar-Spinelli test
for the "totality of the circumstances" test to allow "a deficiency in
one [of the Aguilar prongs to] be compensated for by a strong
showing as to the other." 30 However, in Valley the Montana Supreme Court has interpreted the Gates test-which the United
States Supreme Court said included the "'veracity' and 'basis of
knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information"-to mean
that the Aguilar-Spinelli test is not really "abandoned," but a
lesser-included test.23 1 The Montana Supreme Court decision in
223. Id. at 245-46.
224. Id. at 231 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).
225. Id. at 234.
226. Id. at 230.
227. Valley, 252 Mont. at 494, 830 P.2d at 1258.
228. Id. at 493, 830 P.2d at 1258.
229. Id. at 494, 830 P.2d at 1258.
230. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 3.3, at 193
(1984).
231. Valley, 252 Mont. at 492, 830 P.2d at 1257. The Court in Gates did not intend
the Aguilar-Spinelli test to become a lesser-included test, as evidenced by the Court's own
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Valley indicates that if the Aguilar-Spineli test is not met, the
totality of the circumstances test is not met, and the evidence
should be suppressed. ' The exception to this interpretation is
found in Rydberg.2 ss But the facts presented in Valley appear no
weaker than those presented in Rydberg, in which the supreme
court also applied the Gates test.
In Rydberg an anonymous informant identified the defendant
and two associates with previous drug records and claimed the defendant dealt in drugs. The informant's knowledge was based on
personal observation, and her claims were similar to those of an
earlier crimestopper tip.23" As the dissent points out, however, for
all the issuing magistrate knew, the anonymous informant could
have been the source of the crimestopper tip, as well."3 5 The majority in Rydberg, however, acknowledged that "[t]he application regrettably fail[ed] to state clearly the source of this information. "236
Nonetheless, in Rydberg the majority gave great deference to the
lower court and affirmed its decision that probable cause was es23 7
tablished under the totality of the circumstances test.
The court in Valley neglected to address important issues.
First, the court failed to acknowledge Montana case law where the
court clearly presumed citizen informants reliable. 33 Rather, the
court refers to an Iowa Supreme Court ruling that held that citizen
informants were not presumed reliable. 3 9 Second, aside from mentioning that the lower court relied on Rydberg, 40 the court did not
address its disparate holdings in Rydberg and Valley. A partial explanation may be that probable cause cases are fact specific. A
language:
[A]n informant's "veracity," "reliability," and "basis of knowledge" are all highly
relevant in determining the value of his report. We do not agree, however, that
these elements should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case .... [These elements] should be
understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the
common-sense, practical question whether there is "probable cause" to believe
that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 230.
232. Valley, 252 Mont. at 494, 830 P.2d at 1258.
233. Rydberg, 239 Mont. at 72-73, 778 P.2d at 903-04.
234. Id. at 71-72, 778 P.2d at 902.
235. Id. at 77, 778 P.2d at 906 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 73, 778 P.2d at 904.
237. Id. at*72-73, 778 P.2d at 903-04.
238. See State v. Sharp, 217 Mont. 40, 46, 702 P.2d 959, 962 (1985) (citing State v.
Kelly, 205 Mont. 417, 436, 668 P.2d 1032, 1043 (1983), and State v. Leistiko, 176 Mont. 434,
439, 578 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1978)).
239. Valley, 252 Mont. at 493, 830 P.2d at 1258 (citing Iowa v. Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d
184, 189 (Iowa 1990)).
240. Id. at 492, 830 P.2d at 1257.
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443

more probable explanation may be that Rydberg indicates the confusion and inherent subjectivity involved in applying the Gates
test.
In State v. Deskins the dissent attacked the Gates test as subjective, "a step backward in the development of any set of coherent
rules to deal with information supplied by an informant," and "an
art form which is not based on any reason or rule of law. ' 24 1 Additionally, the dissent in Deskins stated that Montana should have
rejected the Gates test because, in part, the right to privacy provision in Montana's Constitution
mandates a higher standard before
42
warrant.1
search
a
issuing
In Deskins the majority applied the Gates test in holding that
sufficient probable cause existed to support the issuance of a
search warrant when an anonymous informant's reliability can be
established by independent corroboration.2 43 The informant in
Deskins stated that he personally observed a marijuana growing
operation in the basement of a house located at 600 or 602 South
Avenue East. The defendant did in fact own the property located
at 600 and 602 South Avenue East, and the electrical power
records indicated usage consistent with that required for a mari244
juana growing operation.
The dissent in Deskins advocated a "renewed adherence to the
two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test."2 45 The dissent stressed, "however, that the two prongs of Aguilar-Spinelli need only be met
when the police are relying upon evidence obtained through an informant. ' '246 Also, in Deskins the dissent forewarns the court not to
attach any presumptions to information obtained through anonymous informants without first establishing the informant's reliability. 47 The dissent argued that the police officers in Deskins failed
this second prong of the Aguilar-Spinelli test based on the innocent fact that the defendant in fact owned the property at the addresses given and the unsupported electrical records. 4 8
The dissent in Deskins suggested that Montana reject completely the Gates test.24 9 Montana has in fact adopted the Gates
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

State v. Deskins, 245 Mont. 158, 165-66, 799 P.2d 1070, 1074-75 (1990).
Id. at 170-71, 799 P.2d at 1077-78.
Id. at 162-63, 799 P.2d at 1072-73.
Id. at 159-60, 799 P.2d at 1071.
Id. at 166, 799 P.2d at 1075.
Id.
Id. at 167, 799 P.2d at 1075-76.
Id. at 169, 799 P.2d at 1077.
Id. at 170-71, 799 P.2d at 1077-78.
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test, however.26 0 Nonetheless, it is unclear from Valley whether
Montana adheres to the Gates test or has retained its predecessor,
the Aguilar-Spinelli test. On the other hand, it is arguable that
two standards exist for reviewing probable cause determinations in
Montana: the Gates test and the test enumerated by the dissent in
Deskins (Aguilar-Spinelli test as applied under the guise of
Gates). Until definitively addressed by the court, the confusion regarding the standard for determination of probable cause will continue in Montana.
VII.

EVIDENCE

State v. Christenson: Videotape Use: Admission into Evidence
and into the Jury Room
In State v. Christenson25 1 the Montana Supreme Court considered whether the district court committed reversible error, initially by admitting a videotape of the crime scene into evidence
and later by permitting the jury to view the videotape during deliberations.2 2 The supreme court held that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the videotape into evidence.25
Likewise, the supreme court found permitting the videotape to go
to the jury room did not prejudice the defendant. 2"
The case against the defendant began when he answered a
knock at his door on September 5, 1989, and discovered law enforcement officers with a search warrant. Shortly after finding sufficient evidence of a crime,25 5 the officers escorted the defendant
and his roommate to jail. The remaining officers, including Detective Jacobs, then continued their search while documenting on
videotape the items found and their location.25 6
At trial the defendant's attorney stipulated to admitting the
videotape into evidence if played without sound.2 57 The jury convicted the defendant of criminal possession of cocaine, a lesser-included offense of criminal possession of methamphetamine, and
criminal possession of dangerous drug paraphernalia.2 58 The defendant appealed, claiming: (1) the videotape lacked the requisite
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 163, 799 P.2d at 1073 (citing Kelley, 205 Mont. at 440, 668 P.2d at 1045).
250 Mont. 351, 820 P.2d 1303 (1991).
Id. at 353, 820 P.2d at 1305.
Id. at 361, 820 P.2d at 1310.
Id.
Id. at 359, 820 P.2d at 1308.
Id. at 353-54, 820 P.2d at 1305.
Id. at 354, 820 P.2d at 1305.
Id. at 354, 820 P.2d at 1306.
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authentication for admission into evidence because "the videotape
did not fully show the premises prior to, during, and after the
search," (2) the videotape prejudiced him as evidenced by the
jury's viewing the videotape during deliberations, and (3) viewing
the jury "to give undue
the videotape during deliberations allowed
25 9
weight to this testimonial evidence.

Currently, the only Montana statute or rule of evidence that
specifically sets forth a framework for admitting videotaped evidence at trial relates to testimony of sex crime victims.

260

Video-

tapes do, however, fall within the definition of photographs.16 Ad262
ditionally, videotapes must meet both the relevancy standard
and the authentication or identification requirement 263 to be admitted into evidence.
On appeal the defendant did not challenge the relevancy of
the videotape, only its authenticity. 6 " Under Montana law, authentication requires that evidence be "sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 21 6 5 In

the instant case, the supreme court held that Detective Jacobs' testimony concerning the videotaping process provided the necessary
foundation for its authentication and admission.266 Since the
videotape's proponent, the State, made no claims other than that
the videotape documented "the search results after the initial discovery of what was purported to be evidence of crime," the videotape did not have to conform to any particular sequence or format.2 67 The adequacy of foundation for the admission of evidence
is largely within the trial judge's discretion.2 68 According to the supreme court, whether the videotape fully documented the premises
259. Id. at 358-60, 820 P.2d at 1308-09.
260. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-216 (1991) states in part:
[T]he testimony of the victim, at the request of the victim and with the concurrence of the prosecutor, may be recorded by means of videotape for presentation
at trial. The recorded testimony may be presented at trial and must be received
into evidence. The victim need not be physically present in the courtroom when
the videotape is admitted into evidence.
261. "Photographs include still photographs, x-ray films, video tapes, and motion pictures." MONT. R. EViD. 1001(2).
262. MONT. R. EvID. 401.
263. MONT. R. EvID. 901.
264. Christenson, 250 Mont. at 358-59, 820 P.2d at 1308.
265. MONT. R. EvID. 901(a). See also Pickett v. Kyger, 151 Mont. 87, 97, 439 P.2d 57,
62 (1968) (holding that proper foundation for a photograph requires the authenticating witness to testify that it accurately represents the scene and to point out any changes).
266. Christenson, 250 Mont. at 358-59, 820 P.2d at 1308-09.
267. Id. at 359, 820 P.2d at 1308-09.
268. Id. at 359, 820 P.2d at 1308 (citing State v. Armstrong, 189 Mont. 407, 432, 616
P.2d 341, 355 (1980)).
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before, during, or after the search does not affect its admissibility
as alleged by the defendant, but rather falls within the jury's exclusive province to accord weight to the evidence presented. 269
The defendant also argued that the lower court should have
excluded the videotape because it was unduly prejudicial.17 0 The
supreme court disagreed and found that playing the videotape
without sound minimized any possible prejudicial effect the videotape might have had on the jury. Additionally, the court determined that the videotape's probative value-corroborating and illustrating Detective Jacobs' testimony-substantially outweighed
any undue prejudice to the defendant. 7 1
Finally, the defendant contended that the jury's review of the
videotape during deliberations prejudiced him in that it emphasized certain testimonial evidence. 2 In Montana the jury may
take with it into deliberations all papers admitted into evidence
and any exhibits deemed necessary by the court.2 73 The jury may
not, however, deliberate with depositions or papers the court refuses to request from the possessors.2 7 ' In support of his contention,
the defendant relied on Colorado v. Montoya, where the Colorado
Court of Appeals analogized a witness's videotaped statement
given to police to a deposition. 27'5 The appellate court found that
unrestricted and unsupervised jury viewing of the videotape constituted prejudicial error to the defendant. 6 The Montana Supreme Court, however, distinguished Montoya on the fact that the
silent videotape in the instant case contained no deposition-like
testimony or statements but, rather, was analogous to a series of
269. Id. at 359, 820 P.2d at 1309 (citing State v. Laverdure, 241 Mont. 135, 138, 785
P.2d 718, 720 (1990)).
. 270. Id. at 360, 820 P.2d at 1309. See generally MONT. R. EVID. 403 which states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence."
271. Christenson,250 Mont. at 360, 820 P.2d at 1309-10.
272. Id. at 360, 820 P.2d at 1309.
273. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-504 (1991) which states: "Upon retiring for deliberation, the jurors may take with them the written jury instructions read by the court, notes
of the proceedings taken by themselves, and all exhibits that have been received as evidence
in the cause that in the opinion of the court will be necessary." See also State v. Thompson,
164 Mont. 415, 423-25, 524 P.2d 1115, 1119-20 (1974); State v. Cates, 97 Mont. 173, 197-98,
33 P.2d 578, 585 (1934); Territory v. Doyle, 7 Mont. 245, 249, 14 P. 671, 672 (1887).
274. Christenson,250 Mont. at 360, 820 P.2d at 1309 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 4616-504 (1989)). That statute has since been amended and now states, "all exhibits that have
been received as evidence in the cause that in the opinion of the court will be necessary."
MONT. CODE ANN.

275.
276.

§ 46-16-504 (1991).

773 P.2d 623, 626 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
Id.
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still photographs2 77 If the court had determined the videotape
were more like a deposition, it is unlikely the videotape would have
been permitted in the jury room. Nonetheless, the court adhered
to the federal and state classifications of videotapes within the definition of photographs2 78 and allowed the videotape into
evidence.
The court, in support of its extension of Montana law, referred
to State v. Morse 80 where it found no error in allowing audiotapes
properly admitted into evidence to go to the jury room.2 8 1 Noteworthy, however, is the fact that the audiotapes considered in that
case were crucial surveillance tapes of poor quality.2 82 Additionally,
the trial court in Morse instructed the jury as 'to the weight to be
accorded to the audiotapes-to disregard entirely the interpretive
testimony if difficult to understand or otherwise inaudible.2 8 3
Following the court's reasoning in Christenson, the critical
distinction in evaluating videotape evidence apparently lies in its
characterization of whether the videotape: (1) recorded relevant
facts as they occurred, (2) portrayed the scene of the litigated
event, or (3) presented a litigant's theory of the case. If the videotape records facts as they occur, as in Christenson, or portrays the
scene of the litigated event, as the photographs in State v.
Medicine Bull,284 the videotape probably will be allowed into the
jury room. In contrast, if the videotape presents a litigant's theory,
2 5
as the movie in Brown v. North American Manufacturing Co.,
or presents witness testimony, as the drawing in Carman v. Montana Central Railway Co., 28 6 then the videotape should not go to
the jury room.
Given the popularity of videotape recorders, the increasing
availability of videotape evidence, the growing number of law enforcement officers carrying videotape recorders, and the court's decision in Christenson, videotapes will appear increasingly both in
the courtroom and in the jury room. Of course, nothing speeds up
the admission of videotapes into evidence like stipulating to their
277. Christenson, 250 Mont. at 361, 820 P.2d at 1309-10. See also State v. Medicine
Bull, 152 Mont. 34, 43, 445 P.2d 916, 921-22 (1968) (classifying photographs as "papers"
entitled to go to the jury room).
278. FED. R. EVD. 1001(2); MoNT. R. EVID. 1001(2).
279. Christenson, 250 Mont. at 361, 820 P.2d at 1310.
280. 229 Mont. 222, 746 P.2d 108 (1987).
281. Id. at 233, 746 P.2d at 115.
282. Id. at 226, 746 P.2d at 110.
283. Id. at 232, 746 P.2d at 114.
284. 152 Mont. at 44, 445 P.2d at 922.
285. 176 Mont. 98, 116-17, 576 P.2d 711, 722 (1978).
286. 32 Mont. 137, 141, 79 P. 690, 692 (1905).
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admission at trial, as the defense attorney did in Christenson.
trial attorney, whether civil or criminal, who does not want a
videotape in evidence should strenuously object to any attempt to
admit a videotape into evidence and to any request or decision
that it go to the jury room. Accordingly, attorneys should educate
themselves on the prejudicial nature associated with videotape evi-

dence, such as "deliberate editorial manipulation, subtle, . . . possibly unintentional bias, . . . [and] the 'familiar power' of televi-

sion."288 The effect of Christenson is limited, at least for now,
because videotapes remain subject to the same restraints as
photographs.289

287. Christenson, 250 Mont. at 354, 820 P.2d at 1305.
288. Sharon Panian, Comment, Truth, Lies and Videotape: Are Current Federal
Rules of Evidence Adequate?, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1199, 1214 (1992).
289. See supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
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